Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy by Laurence M. Ball
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy
Volume Author/Editor: Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer, Editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-72484-0
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/rome97-1
Conference Date: January 11-13, 1996
Publication Date: January 1997
Chapter Title: Disinflation and the NAIRU
Chapter Author: Laurence M. Ball
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8884
Chapter pages in book: (p. 167 - 194)4  Disinflation and the NAIRU 
Laurence Ball 
4.1  Introduction 
Average unemployment in the countries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) stood at 3.1% in 1970. It rose to 5.7% 
in 1980 and 8.1% in 1994. The rise in unemployment was especially severe in 
the European Community, where  1994 unemployment  averaged  11.5%. Al- 
though these movements had a cyclical component, there was also a large rise 
in the long-run trend, as captured by the non-accelerating-inflation rate of un- 
employment-the  NAIRU. OECD estimates of the NAIRU rose for most coun- 
tries in both the 1970s and 1980s (OECD 1994). 
A large literature has sought to explain the rise in unemployment. In recent 
years, most explanations have focused on imperfections in the labor market 
arising from labor unions and from government interventions such as unem- 
ployment insurance and firing restrictions. Often, economists argue that these 
imperfections have interacted negatively with changing economic conditions. 
On the back cover of its 1994 Jobs Study, the OECD summarizes its views: 
“[Mluch unemployment is the unfortunate result of  societies’ failure to adapt 
to a world of rapid change and intensified global competition. Rules and regu- 
lations, practices and policies, and institutions designed for an earlier era have 
resulted in labour markets that are too inflexible for today’s world.” Krugman 
(1994) is more specific about the key economic changes. Summarizing “the 
conventional wisdom,” he focuses on the decline in the equilibrium relative 
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wages  of  low-skill  workers  (arising,  perhaps,  from  skill-biased  technical 
change). In  Krugman’s view, labor market distortions  create a floor on real 
wages, and unemployment rises when equilibrium wages fall below the floor. 
This paper argues that the conventional  wisdom misses a central cause of 
the rise in unemployment: macroeconomic policy, In particular, I focus on the 
decade of  the  1980s and argue that the main cause of  rising  unemployment 
was the tight monetary  policy that most OECD countries pursued to reduce 
inflation. My evidence comes from a cross-country comparison: countries with 
larger decreases in inflation and longer disinflationary  periods had larger in- 
creases in the NAIRU. My principal measure of  the NAIRU is the one con- 
structed by Elmeskov (1993) and used in The OECD Jobs Study. 
In the “natural rate” theories of  Friedman  (1968) and Phelps (1968), the 
NAIRU is determined by labor market imperfections  and is independent  of 
monetary  policy.  My  argument  is  inconsistent  with  traditional  natural-rate 
models. My findings fit easily, however, with “hysteresis” theories (Blanchard 
and Summers 1986). In these theories, a disinflation causes a cyclical rise in 
unemployment, which in turn causes a rise in the NAIRU. My results suggest 
that hysteresis is highly relevant for explaining recent experience. 
This paper also examines the role of labor market imperfections in the rise 
of the NAIRU. I consider various measures of  these distortions, and find that 
their cross-country correlations with the change in the NAIRU are low. How- 
ever, one labor market variable-the  duration of unemployment benefits-has 
a large effect on the size of the NAIRU increase resulting from disinflation. That 
is, much of  the rise in unemployment is explained by the interaction between 
benefit duration and changes in inflation. Once again, my results support hyster- 
esis theories, which attribute the persistence of unemployment changes to labor 
market distortions. More specifically, the results about unemployment benefits 
support hysteresis models based on decreasing job search by the unemployed. 
The remainder of this paper contains six sections. Section 4.2 describes how 
I measure  changes  in  the  NAIRU. Sections  4.3-4.5  investigate  the  cross- 
country relations among changes in the NAIRU, the size and speed of disinfla- 
tion, and labor market distortions. Section 4.6 considers robustness, and sec- 
tion 4.7 discusses the results. 
4.2  The NAIRU in the 1980s 
4.2.1  Measuring the NAIRU 
The concept of the NAIRU is based on an accelerationist Phillips curve: 
(1)  T - T-,  = a(U -  U*), 
where U is unemployment, TT  and T-,  are current and lagged inflation, a is a 
negative constant, and I ignore supply shocks. U* is the NAIRU-the  level of 
unemployment consistent with stable inflation. In the Friedman-Phelps model, 169  Disinflation and the NAIRU 
U* is determined by microeconomic features of labor markets. In hysteresis 
models, U* is also influenced by the path of actual unemployment, and hence 
by macroeconomic policy. 
In calculating the NAIRU, I follow Elmeskov (1993), whose approach is 
also used in The OECD Jobs Study. Elmeskov estimates the unemployment 
rate consistent with stable wage inflation (he calls his variable the NAIWRU 
rather than the NAIRU). There is no clear reason for focusing on wage inflation 
or on price inflation, and so I follow Elmeskov for simplicity. To estimate the 
NAIRU in a given year, Elmeskov compares unemployment and the change in 
wage inflation in that year and the previous one. Assuming a Phillips curve, 
equation  1, the two observations determine the NAIRU,  U*.  For some coun- 
tries, Elmeskov makes ad hoc adjustments to the NAIRU series to eliminate 
outliers. Finally, he smooths the series mildly: he applies the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter with a parameter of 25. This smoothing reduces the influence of supply 
shocks and other transitory shifts in the Phillips curve.’ 
Elmeskov’s NAIRU  series for several countries  are plotted in figure 4.1, 
along with actual unemployment. Generally, the series appear close to what 
one would draw by hand if attempting to capture the long-term trend in unem- 
ployment. Elmeskov finds that his NAIRU series are similar to two other “natu- 
ral-rate’’ series he calculates, one based on the relation between unemployment 
and vacancies and the other based on capacity utilization. 
Elmeskov’s procedure is not perfect, of course. The appropriate approach to 
estimating the NAIRU is controversial. In section 4.6, I consider biases that 
might arise if Elmeskov’s procedure does not completely eliminate the cyclical 
component  of unemployment.  I also consider an alternative measure of  the 
NAIRU based on a univariate smoothing of the unemployment series. 
4.2.2  The Sample 
I  seek to explain the change in the NAIRU  from 1980 to 1990. I chose 
this period because the most important macroeconomic shocks were shifts in 
demand, especially monetary tightenings aimed at reducing inflation and sup- 
porting currencies. One can find reasonable proxies for the tightness of policy 
in different countries, such as the total fall in inflation. Accounting for unem- 
ployment movements during the  1970s is more difficult: one has to measure 
the severity of supply shocks in different countries. 
I end the analysis in  1990 because it is difficult to estimate the NAIRU in 
more recent years. It is not yet clear, for example, whether the large increases 
in unemployment in Sweden and Finland are changes in the NAIRU or devia- 
tions from the NAIRU. At a technical level, Elmeskov’s procedure relies on 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter, which is imprecise near the endpoints of series. 
I.  To understand Elmeskov’s procedure, note that equation I implies T-, - rZ  = a(U,  -  U*). 
Given two years’ data on inflation changes and unemployment, this equation and (1) are two equa- 
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Elmeskov  calculates NAIRU  series for twenty-one OECD countries. Of 
these countries, I examine the twenty with moderate inflation; I exclude Tur- 
key, where inflation was 110% in 1980. My sample of countries is identical to 
the main sample that Layard, Nickell, and Jackman examine in their 1991 book 
on unemployment. For each country, I use an updated NAIRU series that Elm- 
eskov has calculated using data in the December 1994 Economic Outlook of 
the OECD. For two countries, the Netherlands and Ireland, I adjust the series 
based on revisions in unemployment data in the June 1995 Economic Outlook.2 
In Table 4.1, the first column reports the change in the NAIRU from 1980 
to 1990. The NAIRU rose in all countries except the United States, Portugal, 
and Belgium; Ireland and Spain have the largest increases by a wide margin. 
The unweighted average increase across countries is 2.1 percentage points. 
4.3  The Effects of Disinflation 
4.3.1  The Policy Variables 
I examine two variables concerning disinflation. The first is the total fall in 
inflation from 1980 to 1990. This variable measures the overall tightness of 
monetary policy during the decade. In hysteresis models, a larger disinflation 
produces a larger cyclical rise in unemployment,  which in turn produces a 
larger rise in the NAIRU. I measure inflation with the year-over-year change 
in consumer prices, as reported in the June 1995 Economic Outlook. The fall 
in inflation from 1980 to 1990 is reported in the second column of table 4.1. 
The other variable measures the length of  disinflation. For each country, I 
determine the longest disinflation during the  1980s, defined as the greatest 
number of consecutive years in which inflation fell or was constant. This vari- 
able shows whether a given fall in inflation occurred quickly or slowly. 
There are two reasons that the speed of disinflation may affect the change 
in the NAIRU. First, it may affect the size of the cyclical downturn caused by 
disinflation. Ball (1994) finds that slower disinflations produce larger cyclical 
output losses. Second, a given amount of cyclical unemployment may have a 
larger effect on the NAIRU if it is spread over time. This is true in some hyster- 
esis models.  It is true, for example, if the unemployed take more than one 
period  to  become  “outsiders”  in  wage  bargaining  (Lindbeck  and  Snower 
1989), or if only long-term unemployment reduces workers’ job search (Pissar- 
ides 1994). All these effects suggest that a longer disinflation produces a larger 
rise in the NAIRU. 
The third column of table 4.1 reports the length of disinflation in each coun- 
2. For the Netherlands and Ireland, I compute an initial NAIRU series for both the December 
1994 data and the June 1995 data, using the approach in note 1. I add the difference between the 
two series to Elmeskov’s final NAIRU series. This procedure assumes that the data revision does 
not affect the difference between the initial NAIRU and the final (smoothed) NAIRU. 172  Laurence Ball 
Table 4.1  The Sample 
Duration of 
Change in NAIRU  Decrease in Inflation  Longest Disinflation  Unemployment 





































































































aIndefinite benefits are coded as four years. 
try. After experimentation with functional forms, I used the square of this vari- 
able in the regressions below.3 
4.3.2  Results 
Table 4.2 reports regressions of  the change in the NAIRU on the fall in 
inflation, on the square of disinflation length, and on both of  these variables. 
Figure 4.2 plots the two bivariate  relation^.^ 
In each of the simple regressions, the independent variable explains a sub- 
stantial fraction of the variation  in the change in the NAIRU. For the fall in 
inflation,  the  t-statistic is 3.5 and the E2 is 0.37. For length squared, the t- 
3. Inflation in Spain was 8.8% in both 1985 and 1986. The Spanish disinflation would be three 
years shorter if I required inflation to fall in all years rather than fall or stay constant. On the other 
hand, I count only years of disinflation after 1980. If I measured the longest disinflation that over- 
laps with the 1980s, the Spanish disinflation would be three years longer: This adjustment would 
not affect any other country. 
4. In the reported regressions, I assume that errors are uncorrelated across countries, and use 
ordinary least squares (OLS). I have also considered a specification in which errors are correlated 
for countries in the same region. Regions are defined as North America, the EC, non-EC Europe, 
the Antipodes, and Japan. The estimated within-region correlation is close to zero. Consequently, 
two-step generalized least squares (GLS) estimates accounting for this correlation are close to 
OLS estimates. Table 4.2  Disinflation and the Change in the NAIRU 
Dependent Variable: Change in NAIRU from 1980 to 1990 
Constant  -0.593  -0.444  -  1.033 
(0.935)  (0.700)  (0.801) 
Inflation decrease  0.420  0.183 
(0.121)  (0.13 1) 
Length squared  0.123  0.095 
~  (0.026)  (0.033) 
R'  0.367  0.528  0.552 
Nore: Standard errors are in parentheses 
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statistic is 4.7 and the E2  is 0.53. The scatter plots confirm the positive relation- 
ships between the change in the NAIRU and the right-side  variable^.^ 
The correlation between the fall in inflation and length squared is 0.63. It is 
difficult to separate the effects of these variables with twenty observations, but 
the data suggest that length squared has greater explanatory power. In the mul- 
tiple regression, the t-statistic is 2.9 for length squared and only l .4 for the fall 
in inflation,  although standard confidence intervals include large effects for 
both variables. The E2 for the multiple regression is 0.55, only slightly higher 
than the R2 with length squared alone. 
The size and speed of disinflation explain an important part of  changes in 
the NAIRU during the  1980s. Yet  large residuals remain. As one example, 
Ireland and Italy had inflation changes of  15.0 and  15.1%, respectively, and 
both had longest disinflations of eight years. These figures put Ireland and Italy 
near the high end for both variables. Despite these similar disinflation experi- 
ences, the NAIRU rose 9.3% in Ireland and only 3.6% in Italy. Something 
besides macropolicy must explain such differences. 
4.4  The Effects of Labor Market Variables 
Most discussions of unemployment focus on imperfections in labor markets. 
Observers blame unemployment on the power of labor unions and on govern- 
ment policies such as unemployment insurance and firing restrictions. Layard, 
Nickell, and Jackman (1991) show that measures of labor market distortions 
explain much of  the cross-country  variation  in  unemployment  levels in the 
mid- 1980s. It is harder, however, to explain changes in unemployment during 
the 1980s. Most labor market distortions remained constant during the decade 
or decreased, as some countries weakened firing restrictions and reduced un- 
employment benefits  (OECD 1990; Blank  1994). These changes  go in  the 
wrong direction for explaining why unemployment rose. 
Nonetheless, authors such as Krugman and the OECD emphasize labor mar- 
ket distortions in explaining the 1980s. They argue that preexisting distortions 
contributed to rising unemployment through interactions with market forces 
such as greater wage dispersion. If OECD countries experienced similar eco- 
nomic changes, this view suggests that unemployment rose more in countries 
with more distorted labor markets. Many authors use this idea to explain why 
unemployment has risen in Europe but not the United States, where markets 
are more flexible. Motivated by this view, I explore the relation between the 
change in the NAIRU and labor market distortions in my twenty countries. 
My principal measures of labor market distortions are the six variables that 
Layard et al. emphasize. Two of  the variables concern unemployment insur- 
ance: the replacement ratio and the duration of benefits. Three concern wage 
5.  When the change in the NM-RU  is regressed on the length of disinflation rather than length 
squared, the r-statistic is 3.8 and R2  is 0.42. 175  Disinflation and the NAIRU 
Table 4.3  Labor Market Variables and the Change in the NAIRU 
Dependent Variable: Change in NAIRU from 1980 to 1990 
Variable  Benefit duration  Replacement ratio  Coverage of collective  Employer coordination 
R?  0.12s  -0.053  0.039  0.050 
bargaining 
~ 




R’  -0.048  -0.017 
All six variables 
0.064 
bargaining: the percentage of workers covered by  collective agreements, and 
the coordination among workers and among employers. The final variable is 
government spending to help the unemployed  find jobs. Layard et al. report 
these variables as of the mid-1980s. To  check robustness, I also examine a set 
of six variables drawn from The OECD Jobs Study (1994). These include four 
variables similar to Layard et al.’s, and two others: an index of  legal employ- 
ment protection, and the tax wedge between labor costs and workers’ incomes. 
I run simple regressions of  the change  in the NAIRU on each of  the six 
Layard et al. variables, and a regression on all six at once. Most of the results 
are negative. In the multiple regression, the p  value for the hypothesis that all 
coefficients are zero is 0.36. In five of the six simple regressions, the t-statistic 
is less than  1.5; the E2,  reported in table 4.3, range from -0.05  to 0.05. The 
only variable close to significant is the duration of unemployment benefits: it 
yields a t-statistic of  1.9 and an R2 of 0.12. Figure 4.3 plots the change in the 
NAIRU against the duration of benefits; it suggests a mild positive relation- 
ship, but a number of countries have long durations and small changes in the 
NAIRU. (Following Layard et al., I count indefinite unemployment benefits as 
a duration of four years.) 
Regressions using the six Jobs Study variables yield even more negative re- 
sults. No variable approaches significance, and the E2 are all below 0.01. (The 
Jobs Study variables do not include the duration of unemployment benefits.) 
As discussed above, changes in labor market distortions are not a promising 
explanation  for  the  overall  rise  in  OECD  unemployment,  because  most 
changes go in the wrong direction. Nonetheless, changes in distortions could 
help explain cross-country differences in unemployment changes; for example, 
some authors argue that Thatcher’s reforms dampened the rise in British unem- 
ployment. There is less cross-country data on changes in distortions than on 
levels, but the OECD has constructed three variables for both  1980 and 1990, 
or for nearby years. The variables are union density, the benefit replacement 
rate, and the tax wedge. (As stressed by Phelps [1994], the tax wedge is one 
distortion that worsened for most countries during the  1980s.) I regress the 
change in the NAIRU on the change in each labor market variable over the 
1980s. Once again, the results are negative: all coefficients are insignificant. 176  Laurence Ball 
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Fig. 4.3  Benefit duration and the change in the NAIRU 
Thus an extensive  search has failed to find any labor market variable that 
explains nearly as much of the rise in the NAIRU as the size and length of dis- 
inflation. 
4.5  Interactions between Disinflation and Labor Market Variables 
In hysteresis models, increases in unemployment are triggered  by  cyclical 
factors such as demand contractions. But labor market imperfections are the 
reason that cyclical unemployment  leads to a rise  in the NAIRU. Thus the 
models suggest an interaction between disinflation and labor market variables. 
A given disinflation has a larger effect on the NAIRU in countries with more 
distorted labor markets. 
In exploring this idea, I mainly consider the interaction between disinflation 
and the duration of unemployment benefits. Recall that the duration of benefits 
is the only labor market variable with any direct relation to the change in the 
NAIRU. It also proves to be the variable that interacts most strongly with disin- 
flation. 
Figure 4.4 plots the change in the NAIRU against two interaction variables: 
the fall in inflation times benefit duration ((An)X(ben)),  and length squared 
times benefit duration ((L*X(ben)).  Table 4.4 reports regressions of the change 
in the NAIRU on various combinations of the interactions and the individual 
variables from which they are constructed. The interactions are very important. 
Simple regressions yield $  of 0.55 for (An)x(ben)  and 0.59 for (L')X(ben). 
When both interactions are included, the R2 is 0.67. When (An)x(ben)  is in- 
cluded in the regression, the separate (An)  and (ben)  coefficients are insignifi- 
cant. The data do, however, suggest a direct effect of L':  it helps explain the 
change in the NAIRU even controlling for (L')X (ben). 
The last column of table 4.4 presents a particularly successful combination 177  Disinflation and the NAIRU 
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of variables: L2 and (A.rr)x(ben).  The &statistics for these variables are 4.0 and 
4.2, and the Ez  is 0.75. Figure 4.5  shows the close relationship between the 
fitted and actual values of the change in the NAIRU. With twenty observations, 
I cannot draw firm conclusions  about which specification is best. (A priori, 
there is no obvious reason that L2 affects unemployment directly while (AT) 
interacts with (ben).)  Nonetheless, a broad conclusion is robust: the explana- 
tory power of  macropolicy variables increases greatly when  we account for 
interactions with benefit duration. 
I have also explored the interactions between disinflation and the other labor 178  Laurence Ball 
Table 4.4  Interactions between Disinflation and Labor Market Variables 
Dependent Variable: Change in NAIRU from 1980 to 1990 
Constant 
(Inflation decrease) X 
(benefit duration) 







-0.142  0.165  -0.493 
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0.131  0.112 
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Fig. 4.5  Fitted and actual values of the change in the NAIRU. Independent 
variables: (decrease in inflation) X  (benefit duration) and square of length 
market variables that Layard et al. measure. In most cases, these interactions do 
not help explain changes in the NAIRU once we control for the direct effects of 
disinflation. One exception is the interaction between the fall in inflation and 
the coverage of  collective bargaining. However, even this variable adds little 
once we control for the interaction between disinflation and benefit duration.6 
It makes sense that the duration of  unemployment benefits  is the variable 
that  interacts  most  strongly  with  disinflation.  In  some  hysteresis  theories, 
6. A  simple regression of  the change in  the NAIRU on the inflation changehion coverage 
interaction yields an RZ  of  0.46. However, adding this variable to the last column in table 4.4 
reduces R2. 179  Disinflation and the NAIRU 
workers who lose their jobs become accustomed to an unemployed  lifestyle, 
stop searching for work, and become detached from the labor force. This effect 
is likely to be strongest where unemployment benefits are long-lived, making 
it easier to become satisfied with unemployment. My results support hysteresis 
theories based on these ideas. 
Recall that another of the Layard et al. variables is the replacement rate for 
unemployment insurance. This is one of  the variables that does not magnify 
the long-run effects of disinflation. As long as benefits are cut off quickly, they 
can be generous while they last without promoting hysteresis. 
4.6  Robustness 
4.6.1  An Alternative Unemployment Variable 
The results so far depend on a particular approach to measuring the NAIRU, 
the one devised by Elmeskov. Do the results hinge on this choice, or do they 
hold for other reasonable approaches? Elmeskov estimates the NAIRU with 
data on unemployment and inflation. An alternative approach  (e.g., Mankiw 
1994) is simply to smooth the univariate unemployment series. Following this 
approach, I used the Hodrick-Prescott filter to derive a trend-unemployment 
series for each country. (I set the HP parameter to 100, a conventional value 
for annual data.) I then redid my regressions with the change in the HP-filtered 
variable from 1980 to 1990 as the dependent ~ariable.~ 
Table 4.5 presents a sample of the results. They are qualitatively the same as 
when Elmeskov’s procedure is used to measure the NAIRU. The coefficients 
and R2 are smaller than before, but only moderately; for example, E2 drops 
from 0.75 to 0.62 in the equation with L2 and (A.rr)x(ben).  The lower E2 may 
reflect greater measurement error, since the HP-filter uses less information to 
estimate the NAIRU than does Elmeskov. In any case, my basic message does 
not depend on Elmeskov’s procedure. 
4.6.2  A Change in Timing 
Any measure of the NAIRU is imperfect. In general, measurement error in 
the dependent variable does not cause bias in my regressions. Problems may 
arise, however, if the error is correlated with cyclical unemployment-if  cycli- 
cal fluctuations are not completely filtered out of the NAIRU. Since disinfla- 
tion causes cyclical unemployment,  a cyclical component  in the error could 
bias my estimates of the effects of disinflation. This problem might arise with 
either Elmeskov’s NAIRU variable or the HP variable.8 
7. I use  OECD standardized unemployment  series for countries where they  exist, and local 
unemployment series for other countries.  Unemployment data from  1975 to  1994 are used to 
construct the filtered series. 
8. There is, however, no clear reason that the bias goes in a particular direction. If the measured 
NAIRU contains a cyclical component, the errors in the regressions are correlated with the differ- 
ence in cyclical unemployment between 1980 and 1990. This causes an upward bias in the disin- 180  Laurence Ball 
Table 4.5  Disinflation and the Change in Detrended Unemployment 
Dependent Variable: Change in HP-filtered Unemployment from 1980 to 1990 
Constant  0.115  0.115 
Inflation decrease  0.294 
Length squared  0.091 
(Inflation decrease) X 
(benefit duration) 
(Length squared) X 
-  (benefit duration) 
R2  0.264  0.438 
(0.81  1)  (0.614) 
(0.105) 
(0.023) 
0.329  0.558  0.161  -0.464 
(0.551)  (0.490)  (0.508)  (0.534) 
0.06 I 
(0.021) 
0.097  0.054  0.069 
(0.023)  (0.029)  (0.022) 
0.026  0.016 
(0.006)  (0.007) 
0.465  0.496  0.556  0.625 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
To address this problem, I perform versions of my basic regressions with a 
change in the timing. In these regressions, the dependent variable is the change 
in the NAIRU from 1976 to  1994, not the change from  1980 to 1990. The 
independent variables are unchanged: they still measure the size and speed of 
disinflation during the 1980s. If disinflation raises unemployment permanently, 
disinflation during the  1980s should affect the change in the NAIRU  from 
1976 to 1994. And with this dependent variable, cyclical unemployment causes 
less of a problem. If the measured NAIRU contains a cyclical component, the 
errors in the regressions are correlated with cyclical unemployment in  1976 
and in 1994. The errors are uncorrelated with disinflation during the 1980s as 
long as cyclical fluctuations die out within four years. Under this assumption, 
there is no bias9 
Table 4.6  presents  regressions  with  the  1976-94  change  in  Elmeskov’s 
NAIRU as the dependent variable. The coefficients are similar to those when 
the dependent variable covers 1980-90.  The fall in inflation contributes less 
to R2,  but length squared contributes just as much. Indeed, a simple regression 
on (L2)X(ben)  produces an R2 of 0.72. A likely explanation is that, for most 
countries, the longest disinflation between  1976 and 1994 is the same as the 
longest disinflation between  1980 and  1990. Consequently, the difference in 
timing between  the left-side and right-side  variables makes little difference 
when the latter  is length  squared. Changes in  inflation differ considerably 
across the two periods, and so the difference in timing adds noise to the re- 
gression. 
In any case, the results again suggest that my findings are robust. 
flation coefficient if countries with larger disinflations had greater cyclical unemployment in 1990 
than in 1980. It is not obvious whether this condition holds. 
9. Elmeskov’s NAIRU series does not extend back to  1976 for Belgium, Finland, or Ireland. 
For these countries, I use another of  Elmeskov’s natural-rate series, the one based on capacity 
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Table 4.6  Disinflation 1980-1990  and the Change in the NAIRU 1976-1994 
Dependent Variable: Change in NAIRU from 1976 to 1994 
Constant  2.803  1.655  2.380  2.169  1.914 
Inflation decrease  0.352 
Length squared  0.164 
(Inflation decrease) X  0.155  0.035 
(Length squared) X  0.05 1  0.045 
R2  0.106  0.507  0.413  0.716  0.712 
(1.506)  (0.969)  (0.973)  (0.620)  (0.689) 
(0.195) 
(0.036) 
(benefit duration)  (0.041)  (0.040) 








Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
4.6.3  Reverse Causality? 
Does the correlation between disinflation and changes in the NAIRU reflect 
a causal relationship? Several readers have suggested a noncausal explanation. 
In their story, shocks or unwise policies produced both NAIRU increases dur- 
ing the 1980s and high inflation at the start of the 1980s. Countries with the 
largest NAIRU increases also experienced the highest inflation. And high ini- 
tial inflation led to large disinflations, since most countries sought low inflation 
during the 1980s. 
My discussant, Olivier Blanchard, has suggested a test of this idea. The size 
of  disinflation is the difference between initial and final inflation-the  levels 
of  inflation  in  1980 and 1990. Shocks that cause rises in the NAIRU might 
also cause high initial inflation, but they do not cause low final inflation. That 
is, there  is no apparent  reason  that countries with  large NAIRU increases 
would push  inflation down to especially low levels. We  can therefore  learn 
about causality by including initial and final inflation separately in the regres- 
sions, relaxing the assumption that only their difference matters. A significant 
coefficient on final inflation suggests that causality runs from disinflation to 
the NAIRU. 
Table 4.7 presents the results of this test. Both initial and final inflation have 
significant effects on the change in the NAIRU. One cannot reject the hypothe- 
sis that these variables have coefficients of the same absolute size, as assumed 
before. The point estimate is larger for the final-inflation coefficient, which 
goes in the wrong direction for the reverse-causality story. Similar results arise 
when  I  separate the  (inflation change)  X  (benefit  duration)  interaction  into 
(initial inflation) X (benefit duration) and (final inflation) X (benefit duration). 
Thus the data support a causal effect of disinflation on the NAIRU.I0 
10. Blanchard has suggested a specific version of  the reverse-causality story that goes as fol- 
lows. Problems  in labor markets caused  a rise  in the NAIRU that was  spread over the  1970s 182  Laurence Ball 
Table 4.7  The Effects of Initial and Final Inflation 
Dependent Variable: Change in NAIRU from 1980 to 1990 
Constant 
Inflation in  1980 
Inflation in 1990 
(Inflation in 1980) X 
(benefit duration) 
(Inflation in  1990) X 
(benefit duration) 
Length squared 
0.566  0.373 








(0.07  I) 
0.373  0.574 









Nore; Standard errors are in parentheses. 
4.7  Discussion 
This paper argues that disinflations were a major cause of the rise in OECD 
unemployment during the  1980s. I  show that  measures of  the NAIRU  rose 
more in countries with larger and longer disinflations. I also find that disinfla- 
tion had a greater effect on the NAIRU in countries with long-lived unemploy- 
ment benefits. These results  support hysteresis theories based on decreasing 
job search by the unemployed. 
To  conclude the paper, I examine several well-known country experiences 
in light of my results. I then discuss policy implications. 
4.7.1  Country Experiences 
The United States versus Europe. Many discussions of OECD unemployment 
emphasize  differences  between  the  United  States  and  Europe. During  the 
1980s, inflation fell as much in the United States as in many European coun- 
tries, but the NAIRU did not rise in the United States. My results suggest two 
explanations for the U.S. case. First, unemployment benefits last only half a 
year, a much shorter period than in most European countries. Consequently, 
and 1980s. The rise in  the  1970s caused inflation to  rise,  because policymakers resisted  rising 
unemployment with expansionary policy. In the  1980s, policymakers reversed  course and disin- 
Bated. Countries with more severe labor market problems experienced larger rises in the NAIRU 
in both the 1970s and 198Os, and larger disinflations. 
In this story, the ultimate cause of disinflation  was the rise in the NAIRU between  1970 and 
1980. Therefore, following a suggestion by John Shea, I have added this variable to the regressions. 
Once again, my basic results are robust: the new variable is never significant, and there is little 
change in the other coefficients. These results reflect the weak  relationship between changes in 
the NAIRU across decades: a simple regression of the change in the  1980s on the change in the 
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there is little hysteresis in the United States, and the cyclical downturn caused 
by  disinflation  did not raise the  NAIRU. Second, the U.S. disinflation  was 
short. The Volcker disinflation was accomplished in three years, from 1980 to 
1983; many European disinflations started at the same time but lasted several 
years longer. 
Portugal versus Spain. A number of authors, notably Blanchard and Jimeno 
(1993, have puzzled  over the  different experiences  of Portugal  and  Spain. 
Their economies are similar in many ways, yet Spain experienced a large rise 
in the NAIRU during the 1980s while Portugal’s NAIRU fell. Here, my results 
point to three explanations. First, Portugal’s fall in inflation during the  1980s 
was much smaller than Spain’s. (This partly reflects an increase in Portugal’s 
inflation  in the late  1980s after an earlier disinflation.)  Second, in  1985 the 
duration of  unemployment benefits was half a year in Portugal and 3.5 years 
in Spain. And finally, Portugal’s disinflation  lasted three years, while Spain’s 
lasted eight years. (If one extends the data before  1980, Spain’s disinflation 
lasted eleven years, from 1977 to 1988. No other country experienced a disin- 
flation longer than seven years.)” 
Ireland versus Italy. As discussed earlier, Ireland and Italy had almost identical 
disinflations, but the NAIRU rose much more in Ireland. My results suggest 
a simple explanation: the difference in unemployment benefits. Benefits last 
indefinitely in Ireland, but only six months in Italy. 
This comparison puts the Italian case in an unusual light. The NAIRU rose 
3.6% in Italy, less than in Ireland but more than in most other countries. The 
rise in Italian unemployment is often blamed on rigid labor markets; in particu- 
lar, Italy  tops  the  OECD in most measures of legal employment protection 
(OECD 1994). My results suggest that the rise in Italian unemployment was 
low considering  the  large, slow disinflation.  And this  is explained by  labor 
market jexibility along the key dimension of unemployment benefits. Firing 
restrictions do not appear important for explaining unemployment changes. 
Belgium. Belgium demonstrates that long-lived unemployment benefits are not 
sufficient  for  a rise  in the NAIRU. Belgium has indefinite  benefits,  but its 
NAIRU fell during the  1980s. The main explanation is that disinflation was 
mild: inflation fell only 3.3% (compared, for example, to 10% in France and 
15% in Italy). Disinflation was also moderately quick (four years). Disinflation 
11. A confusing feature of the Portugese experience is that unemployment benefits have become 
more generous over time. Currently, most parameters of benefits, including duration, are similar 
in  Portugal and Spain. This similarity led Blanchard and Jimeno to deemphasize benefits as a 
source of unemployment differences. But Portugese benefits were much less generous during the 
mid-I980s, when disinflation occurred. Stingy benefits during disinflation prevented the cyclical 
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was mild in Belgium because inflation was low to start with: it was only 6.7% 
in 1980. 
4.7.2  Policy 
My results imply that disinflation is very costly, especially in countries with 
long-lived unemployment benefits. Disinflation raises unemployment not only 
in  the  short run, but also in  the  long run.  Previous  studies,  including  Ball 
( 1994),  underestimate the costs of disinflation because they assume only transi- 
tory losses. Unless we know that living with inflation is very costly, it may be 
unwise to reduce inflation. 
On the other hand, if policymakers  choose to disinflate, they should do so 
aggressively. Both this paper and Ball (1994) find that disinflation is less costly 
if  it is quick. This paper also finds that the costs are smaller if workers are 
denied long-term unemployment benefits. Efforts to soften the impact of disin- 
flation-whether  through  gradualism  or  through  support  for  the  unem- 
ployed-are  counterproductive. 
In many countries, policymakers disinflated during the 1980s and left a leg- 
acy of high unemployment. Can we now reduce unemployment? My findings 
do not  answer  this  question.  Limits on unemployment  benefits  prevent  in- 
creases in the NAIRU  if  adopted before disinflation, but it is not clear that 
cutting benefits would be helpful today. Such a policy might force the unem- 
ployed back to work, but it might not. If the unemployed are detached from the 
labor market and their human capital is gone, cutting benefits might only in- 
crease poverty. So far, no country  has reduced benefits enough to test these 
ideas. 
My results suggest another idea for fighting unemployment:  expansion of 
aggregate demand. If  tight monetary policy  has raised the NAIRU, perhaps 
loose policy can reduce it -  and perhaps a risk of higher inflation is an accept- 
able price. On the other hand, it is not clear that the effects of tight and loose 
policy are symmetric. A demand expansion would cause a cyclical fall in un- 
employment, but would this reverse the hysteresis process, with workers be- 
coming reattached  to the labor force? We do not know the answer, because 
countries have not tried demand expansions to reduce the NAIRU. 
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Comment  Olivier J. Blanchard 
In his paper, Laurence Ball develops five propositions: 
1.  Traditional explanations for the increase in the natural rate in Europe- 
that is, explanations based on  shifts in exogenous factors from the form of 
bargaining, to taxes, to labor-market rigidities-are  empirical failures. 
2. There is, however, a strong empirical relation in the data. It is between 
the natural rate and disinflation: countries that have had larger disinflations 
have experienced a larger increase in their natural unemployment rate. 
3. Furthermore, for a given disinflation, the increase in the natural unem- 
ployment rate has been larger in countries that had more generous (in the sense 
of longer-lasting) unemployment benefits. 
4.  The last two relations are causal: disinflation is the main cause of the 
increase in the natural rate. And the more generous benefits have been, the 
stronger has been the effect of disinflation on the natural rate. 
5. This is strong evidence in favor of hysteresis theories, which emphasize 
the effects of the evolution of the actual unemployment rate on the natural rate. 
Olivier J. Blanchard is the Class of  1941 Professor of  Economics at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology and a research associate of  the National Bureau of  Economic Research. 186  Laurence Ball 
Given my past work on European unemployment, it will come as no surprise 
that I like and believe Ball’s conclusions. Indeed, my reaction when I read the 
paper is that I should have run these regressions long ago. I blame myself for 
not doing it, and I thank Ball for performing the task. I am, however, the dis- 
cussant of this paper, and my role should be to play devil’s advocate. Are the 
facts really that clear-cut? If so, does causality really run from disinflation to 
the natural rate? And, if so, do hysteresis theories provide a convincing expla- 
nation? My answers are largely yes, probably yes, and unfortunately  not yet. 
Are Traditional Explanations of the Increase in the Natural Rate Such 
Obvious Empirical Failures? 
There is no question that the current official rhetoric that attributes the rise 
in the natural rate to labor and goods market rigidities has run far ahead of the 
evidence. The worst culprit here may be The OECD  Jobs Study (OECD 1994). 
The study has two parts. The first is composed of  two long “annexes,” part  1 
and part 2, which do a remarkable job of presenting and analyzing the available 
micro- and macro-evidence on all relevant aspects of labor markets, from the 
role of reallocation and relative shifts in demand, to the role of wage setting, 
to the role of unemployment-benefit systems, to the role of taxes, and so on. 
The second is the official report itself, which could have been (and may well 
have been) written independently  of  the two annexes,  and  singles out labor 
market flexibility as the key to achieving lower unemployment. The contrast 
between the carefully argued conclusions of the annex and the simple message 
of the official report is simply jarring. 
It is also true that formal econometric panel studies of OECD countries have 
had limited success in explaining either the increase in the natural rate over 
time or cross-country differences in current unemployment rates. The evidence 
is reviewed  in a recent paper by  P.  N. Junankar and Jakob Madsen  (1995). 
Junankar and Madsen estimate unemployment equations for a panel of twenty- 
two OECD countries for the years 1960-85  and examine the fit of four differ- 
ent specifications based on four influential theories, by Bruno and Sachs in the 
1970s, by Layard and Nickel1 in the early 1980s, by McCallum and by Phelps 
more recently. They show  the  very  limited  success of  these regressions, in 
terms of fit, subsample stability, and so on. More importantly, they show that, 
in the postsample years  1986-9 I, a second-order autoregressive process for 
the  unemployment rate,  with  country  effects,  has  substantially  lower mean 
square error than all four structural specifications. 
The state of the art in such unemployment regressions may be a recent paper 
by  Jackman, Layard, and Nickell (1996), written for a recent OECD confer- 
ence. The results of estimation of their basic specification for two time periods 
and twenty countries are reproduced in the first column of table 4C. 1. To get a 
sense of what these results imply, I give the values and the contributions of the 
explanatory variables for two countries, Spain and Portugal, and show how the 
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Table 4C.1  Unemployment Rate Regressions from Jackman, Layard, and Nickell 
(1996) 
Spain  Portugal 
Unemployment Rate Equals  Value  Contribution  Value  Contribution 
-0.22  X constant 
+O.  1 I * X replacement rate 
+0.35 X benefit duration 
-0.09  X active labor policy 
+4.14* X union coverage 
-2.80*  X union coordination 
-2.82*  X employer coordination 
+O. 10 X employment protection 
-0.64  X change in inflation 
+0.54 X dummy 1989-94 
Implied unemployment rate 1983-88 







































Source: Jackman, Layard, and Nickell 1996, tables 2 and 3 
Notes; The dependent variable is the average unemployment rag for 1983-88  and for 1989-94, 
for twenty OECD countries. There are thus forty observations. R2  = 0.74. Many of the variables 
on the right-hand side are ranking indices. The “change in inflation” is the average annual change 
in inflation during the corresponding six-year period, and is there to capture the difference between 
the actual unemployment rate and the natural unemployment rate. 
*&statistic above 2. 
in the two countries. (I see Spain and Portugal as providing an acid test of any 
theory of unemployment [Blanchard and Jimeno 199.51: Spain has the highest 
unemployment rate in the OECD, Portugal one of the lowest.) 
At first glance, the regression does a good job of fitting cross-country differ- 
ences. R2  is 0.74. The regression also appears to explain the movement of un- 
employment over time, at last since the mid-1980s: the time dummy for the 
second period, 1989-94,  is neither large nor significant. The statistically and 
economically significant variables  are the generosity  of the unemployment- 
benefit system (in contrast to Ball’s results, however, the variable that is sig- 
nificant is the replacement rate, not the duration of benefits), and the structure 
of bargaining (union and employer coordination). Labor market rigidities (em- 
ployment protection) play only a marginal role. Tax rates, which figured pre- 
eminently in earlier studies, are altogether absent. Note also the absence of 
variables such as the minimum wage, or proxies for the intensity of realloca- 
tion and structural change, which figure so much in current discussions. 
But the limits of this regression are also clear. This specification is surely 
unable to explain the increase in unemployment from the early 1970s to the 
mid-l980s, the most important puzzle to be explained: most of the explanatory 
variables have moved the wrong way. And the application to Spain versus Por- 
tugal gives reason to doubt that robust structural relations have been uncovered. 
The regression predicts  a difference in unemployment  rates of  only 4%, in 188  Laurence Ball 
contrast to an actual difference of 12%. Most of the difference is accountable 
to a difference of  1 in the “employer coordination” index (which ranges from 
1 to 3), obviously a difficult variable to measure. 
To summarize, I agree with Ball. Economists have been largely unsuccessful 
at isolating robust relations between the increase in unemployment over time 
and shifts in exogenous factors. It is surely justifiable to look for other mecha- 
nisms. 
Has Disinflation Caused the Increase in the Natural Rate? 
In contrast, the facts on  disinflation and the change in the unemployment 
rate emphasized in the paper are,  I  believe,  very robust.  The main  issue is 
whether correlation  should be interpreted as causality. When I discussed the 
paper at the conference, my comments focused primarily on this issue. I sug- 
gested the following alternative interpretation of the data: 
In contrast to Ball’s interpretation, the increase in the natural rate has been 
due to exogenous factors in all countries. 
Countries that had the largest increase in the natural rate in the  1970s also 
had the largest increase in the 1980s. 
Countries were  slow to  allow the actual rate to adjust to the new, higher, 
natural rate. Thus countries that had the largest increase in the natural rate in 
the 1970s also had the highest rate of inflation at the end of the 1970s. 
All countries now have low inflation. Thus countries that had the highest rate 
of inflation at the end of the 1970s have had the largest disinflation. 
It follows that countries that  have had the largest disinflation are also the 
countries  where  the natural unemployment  rate  increased  the most  in the 
1980s. But  the  relation  is  spurious.  Or put  another  way,  the increase  in 
the natural rate is what has caused the size of the inflation, and thus the size 
of the disinflation, not the other way around. 
This story may be challenged on various grounds. But it is a logically impec- 
cable alternative to Ball’s interpretation. Can the two alternative interpretations 
be told apart? At the conference, I suggested one way  in which this might be 
done. Decompose disinflation as inflation in 1990 minus inflation in 1980, and 
allow the two inflation terms to enter with separate coefficients. Under Ball’s 
hypothesis that disinflation matters, the two terms should come in with coeffi- 
cients equal but of opposite sign. Under the alternative hypothesis, only infla- 
tion in 1980 should matter, not how low governments decided to push inflation 
down at the end of the 1980s. 
I was not optimistic that this would  work. Ball has carried it out, and the 
results  are reported  in table 4.7. It works like a charm: the coefficients  are 
nearly equal and of opposite sign. I cannot think of alternative stories for re- 
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Can Hysteresis Theories Explain the Results? 
Do hysteresis theories provide a satisfactory explanation for Ball’s results? 
At some general level, yes. Hysteresis theories of unemployment were devel- 
oped precisely to explain why disinflation and high actual unemployment can 
lead, at least for some time, to an increase in the natural rate of unemployment. 
Let me briefly review these theories. Most give a central role to long-term 
unemployment: high prolonged unemployment leads to a high proportion of 
long-term unemployed. 
This affects labor supply. The long-term unemployed adapt to unemploy- 
ment. Some give up looking for work, because  they  find the probability of 
getting work too small to justify intensive search. They find ways of surviving, 
often by relying on the other earners in the family. They return home. In short, 
they adjust-not  happily, but they adjust-to  unemployment. And, although 
they might be formally looking for work, and therefore be classified as unem- 
ployed, many no longer effectively are, and, therefore, they put very little pres- 
sure on wages. This leads to a higher natural rate of unemployment. 
On the labor-demand side, firms look at the long-term unemployed  as less 
employable than the short-term unemployed. From the point of view of firms, 
this may not be a major decision. In a depressed labor market, vacancies gener- 
ate many applications, and firms need simple ways of ranking applicants. One 
simple way, once they have accounted for the objective characteristics of appli- 
cants, is to rank them according to the length of time that they have been out 
of work. Other things equal, someone who has been out of work for a longer 
time is likely to be less employable than somebody who has not, either because 
of intrinsic characteristics that the market has recognized, or  just because work 
habits have deteriorated and this person might be harder to train. As a result, 
firms tend to hire the  short-term unemployed first and the long-term unem- 
ployed next. 
This is tough on the long-term unemployed, but it also has implications for 
wage determination and for the natural rate. It implies that for those who are 
still employed, labor market prospects are substantially better than the aggre- 
gate unemployment  number would  suggest: they know  that, if  they were to 
lose their job, they would actually be ahead of a number of people in the labor 
market, namely the long-term unemployed. To the extent that firms have a pol- 
icy of  hiring  first people who have been out of  work for a short time, their 
prospects as an employed worker are actually much better than the prospects 
of the typical unemployed worker, who has been unemployed for a longer pe- 
riod of time. As a result, the pressure of unemployment on wages is low. Put 
another way, the natural rate of unemployment may become quite high. 
These factors point to a more general and more diffuse effect at work here, 
namely that society, in its many dimensions, also adapts to higher persistent 
unemployment. When unemployment and the proportion of long-term unem- 
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cess, to make life bearable for those who are long-term unemployed. Through 
unemployment benefits, safety nets, real or pseudo-training programs, govern- 
ments basically make sure that people do not  starve. This is the normal re- 
sponse both from a normative and a positive point of view to high unemploy- 
ment. Nevertheless, it has very much the same effect as the factors I discussed 
earlier, namely that, by making unemployment more bearable, it increases the 
natural rate of unemployment. 
Are these channels plausible? Yes. Can they explain the magnitudes of the 
results found in the paper, the apparently  large effects of disinflation on the 
natural rate? The honest  answer  is, we do not know. We  have some formal 
models, some pieces of empirical evidence. But whether these channels can 
explain large and long-lasting effects of disinflation on unemployment  is far 
from established. 
In my last point, stimulated by one of the results in the paper, I explore one 
aspect of these models at more length. 
Hysteresis and the Speed of Disinflation 
Ball finds that short disinflations have less of an effect on the natural rate. 
He argues that this is what one would expect from hysteresis theories. A long, 
drawn-out recession, he argues, will lead to more long-term unemployment, to 
more discouraged and unemployable workers, and thus to a larger increase in 
the natural rate. If you have to disinflate, he concludes, it is therefore better to 
make it short: this will have less effect on the natural rate. 
The argument is appealing. But it is not right. The shorter the recession, the 
deeper it is, and the higher the proportion of long-term unemployed. A short 
but deep recession may in fact lead to more discouraged workers, and more of 
an increase in the natural rate. 
To make progress, consider the following simple model: 
Assume that disinflation requires n point years of excess active unemploy- 
ment  (i.e., counting only those  unemployed  who are searching).  Let the 
length of disinflation be x years, at nlx point years of excess unemployment. 
Our focus is on the effects of alternative values of x. 
Assume that variations in unemployment are achieved by equal and opposite 
variations in hires and layoffs. Thus an increase  in unemployment  of  1 is 
achieved by hires being lower and layoffs being higher for a year, each by 
0.5. 
Let  U,,,U, denote  short  (less  than  one  year)  and  long-term  unemploy- 
ment. Let e,,e, denote the exit rates to employment from U, and U,,  respec- 
tively. 
Let the long-term unemployed differ from the short-term unemployed in two 
ways. First, let their intensity of search relative to the short-term unemployed 
be equal to p 5 1. Second, let the drop-out rate for the long-term  unem- 
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Table 4C.2  Cumulative Stock of Dropouts at the End of the Disinflation, as a 
Function of the Size and Length of Disinflation, and the Intensity of 
Search p 
Large Disinflation  Small Disinflation 
(20 point years)  (10 point years) 
Slow  Fast  Slow  Fast 
(10 years)  (2 years)  (10 years)  (2 years) 
p = 1.0  I .44  2.13  0.40  0.75 
p = 0.5  3.41  2.79  I .62  1.55 
Let 1, and h, be the valves of layoffs and hires required to achieve the desired 
path of unemployment. Under the assumptions above, the equations of motion 
for U,,,  and Ul,,  are given by 
(1)  U0.r  = 1, 
and 
(2) 
Short-term unemployment is equal to layoffs. The number of long-term unem- 
ployed  is equal to those short-term  unemployed who did not get a job, plus 
those long-term unemployed who did not get a job and did not drop out. 
The exit rates from short- and long-term unemployment are in turn given by: 




where the number of unemployed is adjusted for their search intensity. 
Let me measure the increase in the natural rate as the cumulative sum of 
workers who give up searching as a result of the disinflation. (Thus, I am as- 
suming that they will still be counted as unemployed in official statistics, al- 
though they are in fact not searching anymore.) Denote this sum by S,. 
Table 4C.2 reports  the value  of S  when disinflation ends. It does it for a 
large and a small disinflation (the proportion  of long-term  unemployment  is 
nonlinear in the level of unemployment, so that the size of disinflation matters). 
In each case, it looks at both a slow (ten years) and a fast (two years) disinfla- 
tion, and does it for two values of the relative search intensity of the long-term 
unemployed, p = 1 .O and p = 0.5. The steady-state flows of layoffs and hires 
are assumed to be equal to six so that the steady-state values of U, and U,  are 
equal to six and zero, respectively. 192  Laurence Ball 
The results make clear that the larger the disinflation, the larger the increase 
in S. But they show that the effect of length is ambiguous. When p = 1  .O, then 
short and deep recessions lead to a larger increase in the natural  rate. When 
p = 0.5, long and shallow recessions, which allow the stock of long-term un- 
employment to build up, lead to a larger increase in the natural rate. 
Thus, if  there is hysteresis,  should central banks  go for  short and  strong 
disinflations? The answer from the table is ambiguous. It could be fun to exam- 
ine this issue at more length, and the model above may provide a starting point. 
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